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INTRODUCTION

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AT 50 AND THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL MARKETS:
THEMES AND VARIATIONS
Samuel K. Murumba*
I.

OVERVIEW

Tho~e celebrating the Golden Jubilee of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights around the world had no shortage of topics and themes to choose from. This is because the
Declaration, a terse catalogue of rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly at the newly-built Palais de
Chaillot in Paris that December night fifty years ago, has
spawned a lavish structure of interlocking strands-instruments, procedures, and institutions that together make up the
international human rights system-and each strand in that
fabric will reward close study and reflection. Aware that others
would pay abundant attention to this lavish fecundity of the
past fifty years, our intuitions at Brooklyn were that it would
be more rewarding to turn to the future where nothing loomed
quite so large as the emergence of global markets. We believe
that the superb papers and perspective embodied in this issue
have proved our initial intuitions right. Intuitions, however,
were only the starting point, not the decisive influence, on our
selection of the relationship between human rights and global
markets as the theme of our commemorative symposium. Of
greater import was a happy confluence of theoretical and institutional considerations.
First, the theoretical consideration. As Dean Wexler reminded us in her Foreword, "the intersection of human rights
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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and global markets was, of course, not the pressing issue of the
times at the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ... [but] will undoubtedly be a recurring theme in the
Declaration's next 50 years."' There is a good reason for this.
As originally conceived in the Universal Declaration, and in
antecedent natural law theorizing, human rights were principally the claims of individuals "against" or "upon" the state or
the society2 it represented. In Hohfeldian terms, the state had
the primary duties correlative to these rights.' The state, even
a democratically-constituted one, had a monopoly on all forms
of power before which the individual was helpless. In the face
of this overwhelming power, the doctrine of human rights acted as a normative zone of dignity around each human being,
one that the state or the majority may not positively or negatively impinge. In the last decade of the 20th century, however,
the notion of the all-powerful state undergirding the conception
of human rights has taken a severe battering. Since the collapse of communism in 1989, there has been a steady diminution of state power and autonomy. There was, of course, some
irony in the fact that this erosion of state power was a result of
the demise of communism, not its success as Karl Marx had
anticipated in the "withering away" thesis;4 the greater irony,
however, was that the beneficiary of this diminution in state
power was not "Marx's utopian conception of a full communist
society" so idyllic as to need no conceptions of justice5 or
rights, but the market-global markets. It is this shift in power and autonomy from states to markets, and the "disabling of
the state as guardian of the global public good"' that requires
a reconceptualization of human rights to accommodate that
significant new strand in the configuration of international
affairs. Moreover, as indicated in Richard Dicker's account of
corporate responsibility in this issue,7 the creative task of ex1. Joan G. Wexler, Foreword, 25 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1, 3 (1999).
2. See LOUIS HENmIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 3 (1990).
3. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
4. Galbraith sees this as one of the failings in Marx's critique of the capitalist system. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 138 (1987).
5. This is an interpretation which Rawls attributes to R.C. Tucker. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 281 (1971); R.C. TUCKER, THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, chs. I, 11 (1969).
6. RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POSTWESTPHALLAN PERSPECTIVE (1998).
7. See Indonesia: Intersection of Human Rights, Financial Markets and Corn-
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tending human rights' correlative duties to non-state actors
like corporations' is of much more than theoretical significance.
The institutional factor which prompted our choice was, of
course, the presence at Brooklyn Law School of the two outstanding institutions whose concerns nicely correspond with
the broad components of our theme: the Center for the Study
of International Business Law (for the markets component)
and the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest Program (for the
human rights component). These two had hitherto carried on
their respective work in parallel universes that will now begin
to intersect more frequently as their concerns become more
and more hybridized. For me, personally, and for others similarly placed, this hybridization has the added bonus of reintegrating two parts of what had long appeared as an intellectual
split-personality: equal devotion to, say, intellectual property
and to international human rights. The idea of a symposium
on the above theme was warmly supported by Dean Wexler
(whose wise counsel at all stages saved us from some hilarious
pitfalls)9 and readily embraced by the Sparer Committee, the
Business Law Center Committee, and, of course, the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law, whose editor, Dorothy Giobbe,
and Faculty Advisors, Professors Claire Kelly and Maryellen
Fullerton, performed the Herculean task of putting together
this written record of the symposium. A joint organizing committee was duly formed with myself as chair" and began
work in earnest at the beginning of 1998.
It is great to settle on a wonderful theme so propitiously,
but a wonderful theme alone does not a symposium make; for
an outstanding symposium, one needs outstanding speakers.

petition Policy, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 161, 167 (1999).
8. See Samuel K. Murumba, Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Human Rights in
the Twenty-First Century in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 207, 239 (A. Anghie & G.
Sturgess, eds., 1998).
9. Such as my enthusiastic brainchild of having Judge Weeramantry's address at the dinner rather than the symposium. Dean Wexler gently reminded us
that the audience would consist only of the panelists!
10. The other members of the joint organizing committee were: Professors
Claire Kelly and Maryellen Fullerton, Faculty Advisors to this Journal; Professors
Larry Solan, Stacy Caplow and Mary Jo Eyster from Sparer Committee; and Associate Dean Spencer Weber Waller and Professors Norman Poser and Arthur Pinto
from the Business Law Center.
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We were fortunate that Professor Henkin accepted Dean
Wexler's invitation to be our keynote speaker and His Excellency Judge Weeramantry accepted mine to fly down from the
Hague to give the luncheon address. For the papers and commentators for the morning panel, Associate Dean Spencer
Weber Waller secured us Professors Garcia and Dunoff, Mark
Warner, Esq., and Steve Charnovitz, Esq. I thought it would be
an excellent idea to have discussion panels rather than formal
papers for the afternoon session. The impact of global markets
on women's rights, and of the financial crisis in Indonesia
seemed perfect candidates, but I know little about one and
even less about the other. This is where my friends at Human
Rights Watch came to the rescue. Kathleen Peratis, Esq. of
Frank & Peratis, and a fellow Board member who also chairs
the Advisory Committee for the Women's Rights Division of
Human Rights Watch, put together and wonderfully moderated
a magnificent women's rights panel; Sidney Jones, Executive
Director of the Asia Division, and Richard Dicker, Associate
Counsel at Human Rights Watch, along with Associate Dean
Spencer Weber Waller gave excellent presentations on the
intersection of human rights, financial markets and competition policy in Indonesia. The structure of the symposium just
described and reflected in the arrangement of this issue has
three segmrents: Professor Henkin's keynote speech and Judge
Weeramantry's luncheon address, the morning session papers
and commentators' views on those papers, and the afternoon
panels on women's rights and Indonesia.
One of the greatest strengths of the symposium, as the
Dean mentioned, was the rich diversity of perspectives, all,
however, variations on the same theme of the interaction between human rights and global markets.
II.

PROFESSOR

HENKIN'S

KEYNOTE

SPEECH

AND

JUDGE

WEERAMANTRY'S LUNCHEON ADDRESS
Professor Henkin's keynote speech which set the tone for
the whole symposium was at once both a resounding affirmation of the case for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights-he called it the "birth
certificate" of the human rights movement-and a rare insight
into that instrument's intellectual history and pride of place
among the ideas of our time. With characteristic incisiveness
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and lucidity, Professor Henkin painted a four-pillar portrait of
the achievements embodied in the Universal Declaration.
The first pillar of achievement was the movement from a
17th and 18th century idea of natural rights to the powerful
current ideology of human rights we know today. Although the
rights idea features prominently in the American Declaration
of Independence and the French Revolution's Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen, its progress in the intervening 150 years was far from assured. In France, it kind of fizzled and was not heard of until the end of the Second World
War; in America it labored on but under some serious and
debilitating genetic defects. It was the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which gave new life, and ultimately transformed the original idea into the world ideology of human
rights. The Declaration's second pillar of achievement was the
definitional transformation of the phrase "human rights" into a
reasonably precise catalogue of rights-a marriage of the liberal rights of freedom and the benefits of the welfare state. The
third pillar was the universalization of the original rights, and
their acceptance throughout the international community. The
fourth was the rejection of the principle that how a state treated its own nationals was no one else's business-what Henkin
calls the "death certificate" of that axiom and the enthronement of the notion that human rights everywhere are the responsibility of everyone, obligations to everyone. As for global
markets, however, Professor Henkin does not see these as
supplanting nation states, though they can be brought within
the normative universe of human rights indirectly through the
primary responsibility of states or directly through vulnerability to civil litigation or concern for brand integrity.
Professor Henkin's exposition of the international human
rights movement even in its historical and conceptual fullness,
however, understates his own remarkable contribution to that
process. His name is almost synonymous with international
human rights norms which, as gifted teacher and scholar, he
has worked tirelessly to shape and articulate. Much of this
creative work is embodied in such of his works as The Rights
of Man Today," The Age of Rights, 2 Foreign Affairs and the

11. Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
12. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
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U.S. Constitution," and, of course, his outstanding work as
Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute's Restatement14
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
which contains one of the most authoritative articulations of
the customary international law of human rights. As a colleague on that project tells it, Professor Henkin's unmistakable
imprint on international human rights law which came from
that work was no accident:
I came to know Henkin intimately in the course of work on
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States .... We did not like the title of the Restatement that we were presented with. In many ways we were
engaged in stating, not restating [and] Louis Henkin was
not ashamed to be original in his thinking. Furthermore, we
were not addressing Foreign Relations law-to some persons
virtually an oxymoron and certainly not a discipline. It was
international law that was our focus, [even] if, more than
once in our endeavors, Professor Henkin had to explain to a
prominent judge
or lawyer that "Yes, Virginia, there is such
15
a law ... .
His Excellency Judge Weeramantry's luncheon address
focused on the specific relationship between human rights and
the market, one of his enduring scholarly interests. Judge
Weeramantry-who has been a member of the International
Court of Justice since 1991 and Vice-President of that Court
since February 1997, and was, prior to that, the Sir Hayden
Starke Professor of Law at Monash University, Melbourne,
Australia-is a prolific scholar who has written sixteen books
and numerous articles on the law of contract, jurisprudence
and human rights, including five books on the relationship
between human rights and technology. But his scholarly output did not cease with his election to the World Court. On the
contrary, it has flourished on that court as well, resulting in
judicial opinions that have attracted scholarly attention. 6

13. Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
1996).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
15. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing InternationalLaw: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COL. J. TRANSNATL L. 121 (1997).
16. Most recently, see FALK, supra note 6, at 178-79, 190-98, 203-05.
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Judge Weeramantry's thesis that human rights and markets are inextricably intertwined is built on two premises: the
fact that all human rights-n'ot just social and economic
rights-have an economic substratum, and the need for markets to be brought into the moral or ethical universe. I think
that to understand the complex portrait of the relationship
between human rights and markets which Judge Weeramantry
painted we need to view it against the background of traditional understandings of those two notions.
Let us begin with our basic pair-human rights and markets-the relationship between which may not be readily apparent at first. Next, let us supply the other phenomena which
are traditionally regarded as the respective theoretical substrata of our basic pair: ethical theory or ethics for human rights,
and economic theory for markets. Now we have the traditional
set of correlates that looks something like this:
FIGURE I.

$

Jf

HuMAN RIGHTS

MARKETS

ETMiCAL THEORY

ECONOMIC THEORY

We, however, still do not have an obvious relationship
between human rights and markets. That is revealed by the
next stage of Weeramantry's scheme, which cross-links these
notions to each other's substratum, so that human rights now
have an economic theory as a strand in their substratum, and
markets have ethics as a strand in theirs. The picture now
looks something like this:
FIGURE II.
HuMAN RIGHTs
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Contrary to the traditional view which sees them only in
terms of ethical theory, human rights according to Judge
Weeramantry-be they civil and political rights or economic
and social rights-have an economic substratum or they would
not be much use to anyone. The economic substratum is thus
of their very essence. Similarly, markets, too, have an ethical
substratum. They presuppose a whole variety of norms-such
as those constraining violence or fraud-including those establishing rights such as the right to property."7 Moreover, they
have no normative primacy as ends. in themselves, and to treat
them as such flies in the face of their historical role and is
productive of the "blindspots" which Judge Weeramantry outlines in his speech. In sum, although on the surface, there is
no obvious link between human rights and markets, an indirect relationship emerges in their deeper structure which
Judge Weeramantry reveals.

III. THE MORNING SESSION
The morning session consisted of Frank Garcia and Mark
Warner's lively contrasting perspectives on whether the global
market was a friend or foe of human rights, and of the views of
able commentators-Jeffrey Dunoff and Steve Charnovitz-on
those perspectives.
Frank Garcia's excellent paper is an incisive scrutiny of
the relationship between human rights and what he sees as
the two principal components of globalization: transactional
and regulatory. Together these have transferred much autonomy from states to the marketplace and its institutions.
Although Frank Garcia acknowledges some positive effects
of market globalization-in both its transactional and regulatory forms-on the vitality and effectiveness of human rights, he
also warns against an unqualified embrace of globalization as
a friend of human rights. His cautionary note prompted by the
fact that the institutional and normative underpinnings of the
marketplace with its consequentialist trade-offs and their model of human beings as homo economicus, or rational self-interest maximizers, is inherently alien to the deontological vision
and model of humanity which are at the heart of human

17. See Jeremy Waldron, Is Coleman Hobbes or Hume (or Perhaps Locke?), in
ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 117, 117 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
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rights. It is possible to alleviate some of the worst aspects of
this disjunction, for instance by subjecting the consequentialist
trade-offs of trade institutions like the WTO to robust human
rights standards. That, however, is not an approach these
institutions do, or are as yet likely to embrace with any enthusiasm.
By contrast to Frank Garcia's caution about the wholehearted embrace of markets, Mark Warner mounts a wonderfully provocative and spirited defense of the global market and
reserves his cautionary note for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in particular, and the human rights movement
in general. For Warner, globalization of markets is not something sinister; rather, it is the spur to economic liberalization,
cheaper prices, and universal welfare. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the other hand, is hopelessly incoherent because it tries to do too many things, while human rights
NGOs are undemocratic and lacking in transparency. Warner
is reluctant to leave human welfare to such a combination of
normative incoherence and institutional unaccountability.
Beyond a very narrow group of human rights concerns that can
command universal consensus-for instance, slavery, apartheid, torture-he would rather leave the rest to the economic
liberalization of global markets which, in his view, are more
likely to deliver greater welfare and benefits to people everywhere than incoherent rights.
In two brilliant commentaries on these contrasting main
perspectives, Steve Charnovitz and Jeffrey Dunoff bring fresh
insights of their own to this debate. Both challenge the basic
premises of the contrast between rights and markets on which
Garcia and Warner take sharply opposing sides. Charnovitz
ingeniously argues that, far from natural enemies, both international economic law and international human rights law are
avenues to the common end of individual freedom and autonomy, since both limit or circumscribe governmental interference
in private decisionmaking. Although one could argue that this
view is more true of negative rights than of positive rights, it
highlights a point of significant convergence of human rights
and markets that is easily overlooked. Jeffrey Dunoffs comment on the principal papers tackles another tenet of the "divergence thesis": the displacement of states by the market.
There is an echo here of Professor Henkin's argument but
Professor Dunoff makes the further point that were the state
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indeed to wither away, both human rights and markets would
suffer, not benefit. In this respect, he has joined two groups of
contemporary scholars: those who have questioned the adequacy of what Jules Coleman has referred to as the market paradigm 18 or its claim to normative or ontological primacy on the
one hand, and those who have demonstrated that even liberty
cannot exist without a structure19 and that liberalism is not
inconsistent with affirmative obligations," on the other.
These two perspectives are a useful corrective upon respective
tendencies to turn human rights or markets into utopian, autonomous constructs.
IV. THE AFTERNOON PANELS
As already mentioned, the format of the afternoon session
was different from that of the morning session. Instead of
formal papers and the views of commentators, the afternoon
session consisted of two panels of experts dealing in considerable depth with two contemporary sites of dynamic interaction
between human rights and markets: women's human rights
and crises in financial markets. These offered an opportunity
to test the theoretical perspectives of the morning session on
concrete problems, and we were fortunate to have panelists
with rich and varied practical experience.
As already mentioned, the women's rights panel was put
together and moderated by Kathleen Peratis, whose experience
as a litigator and human rights advocate in this field in the
United States and overseas is unrivaled. As she conceptualized
it, it had three components. The first component was a general
perspective on the historical exclusion of women from the
reach of international human rights law, and was addressed by
Joanna Kerr, a senior researcher at the North-South Institute,
Ottawa. She noted that to the traditional barriers to women's
equality in the form of laws, religious and social attitudes, and

18. See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Waldron, supra note 17,
at 117 (stating "the market paradigm presents economic competition as the basic
or primal form of human interaction, and holds that cooperative interaction-that
is, social decisionmaking through political processes yielding legal rules-is necessary only in circumstances where market competition fails').
19. See RANDY E. BARRETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1998).
20. See PATRICIA G. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS (1998).
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institutions, we can now add the globalization of markets,
which has encouraged or compounded the problems of sexual
slavery and forced labor. She also challenged Mark Warner's
conception of "core rights" which did not include these violations as well as his neo-classical economic model as fraught
with the blind spots of the kind outlined in Judge
Weeramantry's speech.
The second component of the women's right panel consisted of three specific contexts in which the global market has
had a major impact. These were lucidly detailed by Martina
Vandenberg, a researcher on women's rights at Human Rights
Watch. The three illustrative case studies which Ms.
Vandenberg appropriately characterized as "violations without
borders" are rape and sexual harassment in the Russian Federation, pregnancy-based sex discrimination in the
Maquiladoras,and the trafficking of Burmese women and girls
into Thailand for forced prostitution. With a wealth of detail,
Vandenberg painted a vivid and instructive picture of the
darker side market globalization in these three case studies.
The final component in the women's rights panel was
Professor Elizabeth Schneider's reflection on, and exposition of,
challenges, strategies and lessons for those concerned with
women's human rights. These had to be conceptualized from
what had been learnt about notions such as the public/private
dichotomy, the violence of privatization, as well as the human
rights concept of universalization that Professor Henkin had
articulated in his keynote speech, as a rallying point of international consensus and network of women's rights activists.
Professor Schneider, who is the Chair of the Sparer Committee, the co-sponsor of the symposium, used her litigation, activist, and theoretical experience to give an interesting insight
into the interaction between the international and domestic
contexts of women's rights.
The final panel focused on the impact of global financial
markets and multinational companies (especially those involved in extractive industries) with a particular emphasis on
Indonesia. This panel, which was chaired by Professor Larry
Solan, consisted of three presentations. The first was one of
the most lucid and illuminating accounts of the complex situation in Indonesia given by Sidney Jones, Executive Director of
Human Rights Watch/Asia Division. This dealt not only with
the antecedents to globalization, but also with the impact of
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this and the financial crisis which hit Indonesia recently, on
human rights and democratization.
Richard Dicker, Associate Counsel at Human Rights
Watch, focused his talk on corporate responsibility abroad and
the conceptual and legal strategies honed in years of research
and advocacy in this field. The principal legal and conceptual
problem here is the traditional understanding of human rights
and international human rights instruments as primarily addressed to states. He outlined an innovative response to this
obstacle in the ingenious "theory of accomplice liability" which
he expounds in his excellent paper in this issue.
The afternoon session concluded with Spencer Weber
Waller's demonstration of yet another link between markets
and human rights in the common logic of decentralization of
power. With a wealth of historical and contemporary examples,
Waller persuasively argued that the monopolists' concentration
of economic power, which distorts markets, has a perfect analog in the dictator's concentration of political power, which is
anathema to human rights. It is no surprise, therefore, that as
in the case of Indonesia, one finds both in the same person or
family.
As the papers in this issue reflect, the afternoon panel was
a lively and enlightening experience and as essential a component of this successful symposium as the morning one.

